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Involuntary Conversions and the Question
of Qualified Replacement Property
Section 1033 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides for the
nonrecognition of gain when property is "compulsorily or involuntarily
converted."' If an involuntary conversion results in a gain,2 the gain
need not be recognized if the proceeds of the conversion are invested
in similar property3 within a specified period.4 The recognition of gain
and the resulting tax are deferred due to the basis rule. This rule gen-
erally provides that the replacement property retains the adjusted basis
of the converted property plus any amount spent in excess of the con-
1. I.R.C. § 1033. The portions of § 1033 that will be dealt with in this article are reprinted
below:
(a) General Rule.-If property (as a result of its destruction in whole or in part, theft,
seizure, or requisition or condemnation or threat or imminence thereof) is compulsorily
or involuntarily converted-
(2) Conversion into money.-Into money or into property not similar or related in
service or use to the converted property, the gain (if any) shall be recognized except to
the extent hereinafter provided in this paragraph:
(A) Nonrecognition of gain.-If the taxpayer during the period specified in
subparagraph (B), for the purpose of replacing the property so converted, purchases
other property similar or related in service or use to the property so converted, or pur-
chases stock in the acquisition of control of a corporation owning such other property, at
the election of the taxpayer the gain shall be recognized only to the extent that the
amount realized upon such conversion (regardless of whether such amount is received in
one or more taxable years) exceeds the cost of such other property or such stock ...
() Condemnation of real property held for productive use in trade or business or for
investment.-
(1) Special Rule.-For purposes of subsection (a), if real property (not including
stock in trade or other property held primarily for sale) held for productive use in trade
or business or for investment is (as the result of its seizure, requisition, or condemnation,
or threat or imminence thereof) compulsorily or involuntarily converted, property of a
like kind to be held either for productive use in trade or business or for investment shall
be treated as property similar or related in service or use to the property so converted.
(emphasis added).
2. See I.R.C. § 1001.
3. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A) also makes nonrecognition available when property is convened
directly into other similar property. This is rarely the case, however, and all of the litigation
has focused on cases in which the conversion was into money.
4. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(B) specifies a
period beginning with the date of the disposition of the converted property, or the earliest
date of the threat or imminence of requisition or condemnation of the converted property,
whichever is the earlier and ending-
(1) 2 years after the close of the first taxable year in which any part of the gain
upon the conversion is realized ...
I.R.C. § 1033(f)(4) added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L No. 94-455,90 Stat. 1525, extends
the period to 3 years "after the close of the first taxable year" in cases in which certain real
property is condemned.
This long replacement period led one observer to note that, even though involuntary con-
versions are by their nature unforeseen, there are still ample tax planning opportunities. Gerver,
Voluntary Aspects of Involuntary Conversions, 5 TAX ADVISOR 742 (1974). However, the tax-
payer should not seek to have a fire destroy his property in order to maximize such opportunities.
Id. at 751.
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demnation award or insurance proceeds but less any amount of such
proceeds not spent in purchasing new property.5
The general rule set forth in section 1033(a) requires that such con-
versions occur "as a result of [the property's] destruction in whole or in
part, theft, seizure, or requisition or condemnation or threat or immi-
nence thereof." 6 Although this is in form a limitation on the applica-
bility of the section, in practice it makes nonrecognition available in a
wide range of cases. Replacement property qualifies under this sec-
tion if it is "similar or related in service or use to the property so con-
verted." 7 Traditionally this standard had been rather strictly applied.
In 1958, however, Congress enacted the current section 1033(f)(1),
which specifies a more lenient test for condemned real property held
for "productive use in trade or business or for investment."8  It al-
lows "property of a like kind .. . [to] be treated as property similar
or related in service or use to the property so converted." The two re-
sulting tests are not exclusive, because real property that does not
qualify as like kind may still be qualified under the service or use
test.9
The Internal Revenue Service has developed a three test ap-
proach. In addition to the like kind test, the Service has divided the
service or use test into two discrete tests. The basis of the division,
which is set forth in Revenue Ruling 64-237,1'° is the distinction be-
tween two classes of owners: the owner-user and the owner-lessor.
A "functional" test applies to owner-users of property. "Under this
test, property [is] not considered similar or related in service or use to
the converted property unless the physical characteristics and end uses
of the converted and replacement properties [are] closely similar.""1
For an owner-lessor "a determination will be made as to whether
the properties are of a similar service to the taxpayer, the nature of
the business risks connected with the properties, and what such prop-
erties demand of the taxpayer in the way of management, services,
and relations to his tenants.' The Service concedes that the effect
of section 1033(0 is "to extend the nonrecognition-of-gains benefits
of section 1033(a) of the Code to a taxpayer who acquires property of
5. I.R.C. §§ 1033(b), 1011, 1016.
6. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(1).
7. Id.
8. Section 46(a) of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, P.L. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1041. The
paragraph designation was changed to (1) by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,
90 Stat. 1525. The current designation is used throughout this article where practical.
9. $ee two-step analysis in Rev. Rul. 76-390, 1976-2 C.B. 243 and Rev. Rul. 76-391, 1976-2
C.B. 243.
10. 1964-2 C.B. 319.
11. Id. at 319-20.
12. Id. at 320.
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a like kind to real property converted, but not necessarily similar or
related in service or use to it."1
3
Involuntary conversions occur fairly often, particularly as a result
of governmental acquisitions of private property for the development
of public facilities. The long replacement period gives considerable
tax-planning opportunities, but effective planning requires that the se-
lection of replacement property be guided by readily ascertainable stan-
dards. The current state of the law, with the Code and the courts re-
quiring two tests and the Service applying three, does not lend itself to
such certainty. This Note will analyze these tests as they have been
applied in three recent revenue rulings. It will suggest that a single
service or use test be applied to both owner-users and owner-lessors. It
will also consider the question presented in two of the revenue rulings
-whether the construction of improvements on land owned by the tax-
payer is a qualified replacement of converted land under section 1033
-and will suggest that such replacement be considered of like kind.
I. SIMILAR OR RELATED IN SERVICE OR USE
A. Revenue Ruling 76-31914
The corporate taxpayer in this revenue ruling was engaged in the
operation of a bowling center, which consisted of bowling lanes, a
lounge, and a bar. In 1974 the bowling center was destroyed by fire,
and the taxpayer received insurance money in excess of its tax basis
for the property, thereby realizing a taxable gain. The taxpayer used
the proceeds to acquire a billiard center, which consisted of billiard
tables, a lounge, and a bar. It then sought nonrecognition of the gain
under section 1033(a).' 5
The Service denied nonrecognition, concluding that a billiard cen-
ter is not similar or related in service or use to a bowling alley. Rely-
ing on the functional test, which Revenue Ruling 64-237 had reserved
for owner-users of property, 16 the Service concluded: "The physical
characteristics of the replacement property are not closely similar to
those of the converted property since bowling alleys and bowling
equipment are not closely similar to billiard tables and billiard equip-
ment."
17
13. Rev. Rul. 67-255, 1967-2 C.B. 270, 271.
14. 1976-2 C.B. 242.
15. Id.
16. 1964-2 C.B. 319. This test is based on the physical characteristics and end uses of the
converted and replacement properties.
17. Rev. Rul. 76-319, 1976-2 C.B. 242. The Service has again applied the functional
test to owner-users in Rev. Rule 77-192, 1977-22 L.LB. 12. In this ruling a land-based seafood
processing plant was destroyed by fire and replaced by a seagoing plant. Nonrecognition was
granted for replacement of destroyed equipment, but for the plant itself nonrecognition was
denied. The Service reasoned that the taxpayer's ability to transport the new plant from one
port to another was signitigantly dissimilar.
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B. Functional Test Owner-Users
Neither the Code nor the Treasury Regulations offer much guid-
ance in determining whether a particular piece of replacement property
qualifies for nonrecognition. 1 In light of the case law, however, it is
difficult to agree with the position taken by the Service in Revenue Rul-
ing 76-319 regarding the dissimilarity between a bowling alley and a
billiard center. The cases and rulings allow a range of replacement
property that seems sufficiently broad to encompass these two forms of
public amusement.
1. Same Purpose or Use
Both the cases and a revenue ruling indicate that similarity of the
physical characteristics of the original and replacement property is not
crucial for the latter to qualify as similar or related in service or use. A
representative case is Gaynor News Co.,19 in which the taxpayer ac-
quired an improved lot that it leveled for the purpose of constructing
a plant for its business. The property was condemned after all the im-
provements had been removed but before any construction was begun
on the new building. The taxpayer used the condemnation award to
purchase a corporation whose only asset was a lot improved by a build-
ing. The taxpayer tore most of the building down and used the remain-
ing structure in the construction of its new plant. Under these circum-
stances the Tax Court thought it "unrealistic to set up a functional
classification in terms of improved or unimproved property. C2n The
old property, at the time it was taken over .. .was in one stage of the
processing required to achieve a planned objective. . . .The goal in
each instance was identical . .. the function and purpose of the old
property, from the petitioner's perspective, was identical with that of
the new." 21
In Revenue Ruling 58-24522 an improved lot used as a parking lot
was replaced with another lot improved with a building. The taxpayer
immediately demolished the building to convert the property into a
parking lot. Finding that the new property had been made "suitable
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(9) (1957) states:
There is no investment in property similar in character and devoted to a similar use
if-
(i) The proceeds of unimproved real estate, taken upon condemnation proecedings,
are invested in improved real estate.
(ii) The proceeds of conversion of real property are applied in reduction of indebted-
ness previously incurred in the purchase of a leasehold.
(iii) The owner of a requisitioned tug uses the proceeds to buy barge,,
19. 22 T.C. 1172 (1954).
20. The court declined to apply Treas. Reg. I11, § 29.112(f)1 (1949). predecessor of Ttea%,
Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(9)(i) (1957) to the facts of this case.
21. 22 T.C. at 1177, 1179 (emphasis added).
22. 1958-1 C.B. 274.
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for the use for which the converted property was employed," 23 the
Service ruled that the replacement was qualified. "The test to be ap-
plied, in determining whether there is a [qualified] replacement, is the
character of the service or use of the property."
2 4
Just as the physical characteristics of the property at the time of
conversion or replacement are not crucial, the ultimate physical char-
acteristics of the property are not either. In Cotton Concentration
Co.,25 the taxpayer started out with two sheds for storing cotton. The
west shed and one-half of the east shed burned down. With the insur-
ance money the taxpayer built an enlarged east shed with improve-
ments to prevent fires. The court rejected the Commissioner's inter-
pretation of the section stating that "it would not be necessary for a
taxpayer in order to receive the benefit of it, to reconstruct destroyed
property in exactly the same physical condition as the original prop-
erty."
26
Nonrecognition also has been held not to depend on the propor-
tionate allocation of insurance proceeds in the replacement property
between buildings, machinery, and equipment. The Service adopted
this view in Revenue Ruling 67-254.25 In that ruling a portion of the
land on which the taxpayer's manufacturing plant stood was con-
demned. The condemned land had been used as a storage area and
contained a garage that had housed the plant's delivery trucks. With
the condemnation proceeds the taxpayer rearranged the plant on the
remainder of the land to create a storage area and built a new garage
for delivery trucks on a small plot of land he owned nearby. Although
proceeds from the condemnation of the land were spent on construction
and plant rearrangement, the Service ruled that in "restoring the plant-
site so that it could be used in the same manner as it was used prior to
the condemnation, he has acquired property similar or related in ser-
vice or use to the property converted for purposes of section 1033(a)(3)
(A) [now section 1033(a)(2)(A)] of the Code."29
Mode of ownership is another factor that has not been crucial to
the qualification of replacement property. The Code treats the pur-
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. Id. Cf. S.H. Kress and Co., 40 T.C. 142 (1963) (property acquired to build store re-
placed by several stores or buildings to be used as stores held to be similar or related in ser-
vice or use). For an earlier treatment of the subject see Henderson Overland Co., 4 B.T.A.
1088 (1926).
25. 4 B.T.A. 121 (1926).
26. 1& at 126. Nonrecognition was also granted in Columbus Die, Tool & Mach. Co.,
1952 T.C.M. (P-H) 52,312 (condemned industrial plant on 9.1 acre tract replaced by 18 acre
tract on which taxpayer planned to build expanded plant); Flaxlinum Insulating Co., 5 B.T.A.
676 (1926) (flax straw warehouse replaced by warehouse of different construction); Rev. Rul.
57-154, 1957-1 C.B. 262 (farm containing a residential property used for rental purposes).
27. Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co., 15 T.C. 79 (1950).
28. 1967-2 C.B. 269.
29. Id. at 270.
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chase of eighty per cent of a corporation owning assets as a purchase of
the assets themselves, 30 and the courts have held that leased proPerty
may be replaced by fully owned property. In Davis Regulator Co. 1 the
proceeds from the condemnation of a building that the taxpayer had
leased were used to construct a building devoted to the same business
on land the taxpayer owned. The court held that the taxpayer's lease-
hold was an interest in real estate and that since the interest was sold
and the money received was invested by the taxpayer in other similar
real estate, no tax was due on the transaction. The Service has simi-
larly ruled that the replacement of a converted farm with an interest
as tenant in another farm, which is similar or related in service or use,
is a qualified replacement.
32
2. Changes in Purpose or Use--Extent
of Permissible Deviations
Analysis of the variables of time, physical characteristics, and
mode of ownership indicates that there is considerable leeway in deter-
mining what is qualified replacement property so long as the taxpayer
puts the new property to the same use as the old. The difficulty arises
when the taxpayer's use deviates from the purpose of the converted
property. No clear formulation of the extent of deviation permissible
is found in the cases other than the vague requirement that the new
business be "related to" the old. The Service, in Revenue Ruling 76-319,
evidentially found that the operation of a billiard center was not "rela-
ted to" the operation of a bowling center. An examination of the cases
construing this language may be helpful in evaluating the position of
the Service.
The first case that interpreted the words of the statute was Paul
Haberland.33 During World War I the taxpayer's stock in a textile
manufacturing business was seized by the alien property custo-
dian and sold. When the taxpayer recovered the money from the
custodian, he invested it in a business for making starch sizing for
textiles. The court concluded that the replacement was qualified,
noting that
[I]f [section 1033(a)(2)(A)] limited the acquisition to "similar" property,
we might have some difficulty in finding that petitioner's investment met
the test. . . . But the word "similar" is followed immediately by the
30. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A), (E). Cf. Rev. Rul. 70-144, 1970-1 C.B. 170 (purchased by 50%
partner of the remaining 50% owning assets similar to his converted property qualifies). But see
I.R.C. § 1033(0(2) (like kind rule does "not apply to the purchase of stock in the acquisition of
control of a corporation described in subsection (a)(2XA)."); Rev. Rul. 55-351, 1955-1 CAB, 343
(replacement of the property by acquisition of a partnership share is not a qualified replacement),
31. 36 B.T.A. 437 (1937). But cf., Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(al-l(c)(2) (leasehold is not like
kind to a fee unless its term is 30 years or more). See also, The Dvis Co., 6 B.T.A. 281.
32. Rev. Rul. 57-154, 1957-1 C.B. 262.
33. 25 B.T.A. 1370 (1932).
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phrase "or related," which in our opinion, considerably broadens the
scope of the statute and gives the taxpayer more latitude in making an
investment . . .
In M.J. Caldbeck Corp.," part of the taxpayer's property was used
as a movie theater and part was rented to stores. The building was de-
stroyed by fire, and the insurance proceeds were used to construct a
building that the taxpayer leased to a large department store. The
Board of Tax Appeals held that the insurance proceeds were a recog-
nized gain because of the taxpayer's delay in making the replacement
investment. The court commented, however, that had the taxpayer acted
sooner the replacement would have qualified since both were business
properties. Differences in construction did not matter to the court
because "the statute does not require exact physical duplication." 36 In
Stevenson v. United States3 7 in an opinion devoid of analysis, nonrec-
ognition was accorded a taxpayer, who replaced property devoted to
truck farming and cattle raising with apricot, prune, and walnut
orchards.
Although replacement property may be used in different, though
related businesses, it appears necessary for the replacement property
to perform an analogous function in the new business. In United De-
velopment Co. v. United States3 the taxpayer replaced condemned
property used for burial plots with a new cemetery administration buil-
ding. In holding that the replacement did not qualify for nonrecogni-
tion the court rejected taxpayer's argument that the properties should
be considered similar because they both contributed to the production
of income through the operation of the cemetery.39
In Lynchburg National Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner,40 the
taxpayer had acquired a building that it was going to demolish so it
could build an addition to its bank. Because of World War II it put off
its plans and rented the building to a shoe store and a restaurant. The
building was destroyed by fire, and the taxpayer applied the insurance
proceeds to building the addition to the bank. The Fourth Circuit held
that the replacement property was not similar or related in service or
use to the old building. At first this holding seems to contradict those
34. Id. at 1379. See Diamond Milling Co., 10 T.C. 7 (1948) (flour mill replaced by
flour and feed processing plant held to be similar or related in service or use).
35. 36 B.T.A. 452 (1937).
36. Id. See Washington Market Co., 25 B.T.A. 576 (1932) (plant, used for rented retail
stalls, manufacturing ice, cold storage refrigeration, and lease storage and display space for
wholesalers, replaced by property "used in operating the various phases of its business except
that of providing stalls for retail market dealers" held to be similar or related in service or use).
37. 14 A.F.T.R.2d 5917 (N.D.CaL 1964).
38. 212 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. Mo. 1962).
39. Id. In Arnold L. Santucci, 1973 T.C.M. (P-H) 73,178, the taxpayer replaced tangible
personal property used in a car wash with a printing company. The court held that the taxpayer
failed to show the replacement was similar or related in service or use.
40. 208 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1953).
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cases that have held that a taxpayer's planned use governs the applica-
tion of section 1033(a)(2)(A), 41 because here the taxpayer replaced a
property that it originally intended to demolish in order to build a bank
addition, with a bank addition. In Lynchburg, however, the plan had
been temporarily abandoned due to the war and the taxpayer entered
the rental business for the duration. This hiatus in effect resulted in
the taxpayer acquiring new property that was of use in a completely
different business.
Lynchburg, along with the other previously discussed cases, sets
limits to the service or use test, at least as it is applied to an owner-user
of property. In sum, it is the purpose or use of the property in the busi-
ness of the taxpayer and not the physical characteristics of the property
that controls the outcome. This lack of focus by the courts on the
physical characteristics of the property has not been similarly applied
in Revenue Ruling 76-319. Indeed, the Service based its decision on the
physical dissimilarities between bowling and billiard equipment. Com-
mon business sense would appear to lead one to the conclusion that a
billiard center, despite differences in the equipment, is quite similar to
a bowling center. The two are essentially the same recreational busi-
ness. Whatever deviation there is should not disqualify the taxpay-
er's choice of replacement property, especially in light of cases such as
Haberland, in which the taxpayer was allowed to switch from textiles to
chemicals because both were "related" to the same industry.
C. Owner-Lessor-Liant Record Co. v. Commissioner
4 2
The replacement rules discussed above were developed in cases in
which the taxpayer was the primary user of both the converted and the
replacement properties. That is the situation in Revenue Ruling 76-319,
in which the taxpayer was actively engaged in operating the destroyed
bowling center and the subsequent billiard center.
The Service has said that a different standard applies to investors
in rental property than is applied to owner-users.43 The Code, however,
speaks of one test, and a line of cases applying the Code to owner-
lessors has supported the single test view. Prior to Revenue Ruling 64-
237,44 which introduced the two-test idea, the Service had said that there
was only one test-the conservative "functional" test. The Tax Court
consistently applied this test to all classes, holding that for an owner-
lessor mere similarity in the investment character of the properties was
not sufficient. The cases discussed below, which deviate from this posi-
tion and apply more liberal standards, arose before, but were decided
after the addition of the like kind test to the Code. These cases seem
41. See piotes 19-24 supra and accompanying text.
42. 303 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1962).
43. Rev. Rul. 64-237, 1964-2 C.B. 319.
44. 1964-2 C.B. 319.
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to be a reaction to the congressional disapproval of the courts' pre-
viously strict interpretation of the service or use test.45 All but one 6
of the federal courts of appeals reversed the Tax Court or affirmed on
grounds other than the functional test.
In an early case that raised the issue, the Board of Tax Appeals de-
termined that the converted and replacement properties were similar in
that they were both business properties and that the taxpayer derived
rental income from both of them despite the fact that the lessees put the
properties to different uses.47  The Tax Court and the Third Circuit,
however, went along with the Service's contrary view" in cases concern-
ing owner-lessors of property.
Steuart Brothers, Inc. v. Commissioner9 was the first of a series of
cases that established the rule that considers the investment character
of property to be an important one in the qualification of replacement
property under section 1033(a)(2)(A). The taxpayer, engaged in the
real estate business, owned a tract of land that it planned to rent as a
grocery store and warehouse. After the property was condemned, the
taxpayer bought two new properties, one rented to an auto dealer and
the other to the owner of a fleet of taxicabs. The Fourth Circuit, re-
versing the Tax Court, compared the investments in real estate held by
the taxpayer before and after the conversion and concluded that real
estate held- for investment is similar or related in service or use if the
reinvestment is in real estate of the "same general class."50 The court,
however, did not elucidate on what it meant by this phrase.
In McCaffrey v. Commissioner1 the taxpayer replaced a parking
lot leased to a parking lot company with property consisting of a ware-
house and parking area rented to a federal agency. The Third Circuit
rejected the distinction between users and investors that had been set
up by the Fourth Circuit in Steuart, preferring instead to apply the
functional test to the end use of the property.
The Second Circuit, in Liant Record Co. v. Commissioner, at-
45. In S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1958), the Senate Committee on Finance
compared the law regarding involuntary conversions-at that time only the "similar or related
in service or use" test was available-with the more lenient treatment for exchanges of "like
kind" property (§1031). The committee concluded that it was "particularly unfortunate that
present law requires a closer identity of the destroyed and converted property where the ex-
change is beyond the control of the taxpayer than that which is applied in the case of the volun-
tary exchange of business property." Id.
46. McCaffrey v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 27, (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 828 (1960).
47. MJ. Caldbeck Corp., 36 B.T.A. 452 (1937).
48. The position of the Service was stated in Rev. RuLb 56-347, 1956-2 C.B. 517, 518 where
it was asserted that "[tihe purchase of income-producing property of one character to replace
income-producing property of another character does nfot on that basis alone constitute a re-
placement." See G.C.M. 14693, C.B. XIV-1, 197 (1935).
49. 261 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1958).
50. Id. at 584. This approach was approved in S.E. Ponticos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 338
F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1964).
51. 275 F.2d 27 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 828 (1960).
52. 303 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1962).
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tempted to effect a compromise between the viewpoints of the Steuart
court and the McCaffrey court. In Liant Record, the taxpayer replaced
a condemned office building with an apartment building. In reversing
the Tax Court's denial of nonrecognition, the Second Circuit required
that "a single test . . . be applied to both users and investors, i.e., a
comparison of the services or uses of the original and replacement
properties to the taxpayer-owner."5 3 In making such a comparison the
Second Circuit held that it was necessary to "compare, inter alia, the
extent and type of the lessor's management activity, the amount and
kind of services rendered by him to the tenants, and the nature of his
business risks connected with the properties."
54
The Liant Record test has been widely accepted in the other cir-
cults. The appeal of the test is (1) that it seems to apply in all cases,5"
(2) that it establishes more specific criteria on which cases may be
decided,5 6 (3) that it seems to avoid the strictne3s of the physical end-
use test without including extremely dissimilar investment properties,
7
and (4) that it seems to effectuate the congressional intent of inclusion
in the rule rather than exclusion.58
Not all the circuits have completely adopted the Liant Record test.
In Filippini v. United States,59 the Ninth Circuit suggested an all-of-the-
circumstances test for determining whether
the taxpayer has achieved a sufficient continuity of investment to justify
nonrecognition of the gain, or whether the differences in the relationship
of the taxpayer to the two investments are such as to compel the conclu-
sion that he has taken advantage of the condemnation to alter the nature
of his investment for his own purposes. 60
Yet, despite the different characterization of the test, the Ninth Circuit
employed essentially the same criteria as did the Second Circuit in
Liant Record. It merely expanded upon what the Second Circuit called
"the nature of the business risks" by requiring consideration of facts
"which would influence an investor in determining the attractiveness
of the respective uses for his capital: the character and location of the
particular properties; their potential and actual employment; [and] the
state of the market of which each one is a part."61
In Loco Realty Co. v. Commissioner,62 the Eighth Circuit approved
53. Id. at 329 (emphasis in original).
54. Id.
55. Liant Record, Inc. v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1962).
56. Filippini v. United States, 318 F.2d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 1963).
57. Clifton Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1963) (Miller, J. concurring);
Loco Realty v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 207, 215 (8th Cir. 1962).
58. Pohn v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 427, 430 (7th Cir. 1962).
59. 318 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1963).
60. Id. at 844-45.
61. Id. at 845.
62. 306 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1962).
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the result in Liant Record. The court reviewed the history of the prior
case law and noted that the functional test was developed in the Tax
Court when the taxpayers were the actual users. While approving
Liant Record, the court ambiguously stated that it also liked the rea-
soning of Steuart, adding the proviso that something more than mere
investment character is required. Whether "something more" refers to
the Liant Record considerations is not clear.63
In 1964 the Service partially adopted the Liant Record test in
Revenue Ruling 64-237,64 but specifically limited it to owner-users.
Thus, it established a dual standard for section 1033(a). The ruling
states:
[1]n considering whether replacement property acquired by an investor is
similar in service or use to the converted property, attention will be direc-
ted primarily to the similarity in the relationship of the services or uses
which the original and replacement properties have to the taxpayer. In
applying this test, a determination will be made as to whether the proper-
ties are of a similar service to the taxpayer, the nature of the business risks
connected with the properties, and what such properties demand of the
taxpayer in the way of management, services and relations to his
tenants.65
The Second Circuit in Liant Record explicitly rejected a bifurcated
test, holding that "a single test [is] to be applied to both users and in-
vestors."66 It relied on its understanding of congressional intent to al-
low nonrecognition to taxpayers who maintain continuity of interest
and do not alter the nature of their investments. By enacting the
similar or related in service or use test, Congress intended only one
test. In a sense an owner-user is as much an investor as is an owner-
lessor, and that investment should be evaluated in terms of costs and
benefits. The Second Circuit in Liant Record spelled out three factors
that should be considered: management activity; services rendered; and
business risks. 67  The physical characteristics of the property itself
are not considered.68  Rather, the costs of the investment in time,
money, and effort, and the benefits-depending upon rate of return and
the risk involved-characterize investment property as investment
63. For other reasons for adopting the Liant Record test in whole or in part see Capital
Motor Car Co. v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1963) (property leased at various times to
auto agency, school, and paint shop replaced by property leased for construction of motel-court
found similar relationship between taxpayer and property); Pohn v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 427
(7th Cir. 1962) (replacement of property leased to gas station by property leased for construction of
apartments-court required continuity of interest); Ziegler v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 202 (D.
Colo. 1966) (buildings rented as car-lot office and repair shop replaced by properties rented as
office and apartment--court found taxpayer used both properties for investment).
64. 1964-2 C.B. 319. See Harvey J. Johnson, 43 T.C. 736 (1965) in ,hich the tax court
makes a similar retreat.
65. Rev. Rul. 64-237, 1964-2 C.B. 319, 320.
66. Liant Record, Inc. v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1962).
67. Similarly, see Filippini v. United States, 318 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1963).
68. See discussion on the functional test, section I.B.1. supra and accompanying text.
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property. That an owner-user's investment may involve more time and
effort and less cash than that of the owner-lessor should not remove
the former from the investor class. One is as much entitled to the
benefit of the tax law as the other; the difference in investment should
affect only the weight given to the several elements of the test, not
the selection of the test itself.
An application of the Liant Record test to the facts of Revenue
Ruling 76-319 may still lead to a decision denying nonrecognition. This
is ironic since a decision on the Service's terms-the functional test-
should lead to the opposite result, as has been shown. The factors lead-
ing to a ruling of recognition under the Liant Record test, however,
would be applied in a way much more satisfying than the tautological
assertion that a billiard center is not similar to a bowling alley because
they are different. The Liant Record test calls for a comparison of the
demands that the investments make on the taxpayer for supervision
and service.69 In the circumstances of Revenue Ruling 76-319, the tax-
payer's supervision and service activities are clearly similar. In both
the bowling alley and the billiard center, the taxpayer provided family
recreation facilities to the public, provided for the upkeep of the cen-
ters, and perhaps even dealt with the same equipment supplier. On
this level the analysis is a common sense one, parallel to the discus-
sion of the functional test above. On the second prong of the Liant
Record test, which evaluates the nature of the business risk, the tax-
payer may not fare so well.
To evaluate the nature of the risk, the criteria set forth in Filippini
must be considered. 70  The factor that appears to be the most appro-
priate in this case is the state of the market. Bowling is a popular sport
and is well established in many communities across the country. The
same may not be true with billiards. 71 The new billiard center, at the
time of acquisition, may have been much more speculative as an invest-
ment than a new bowling alley. If that were so, such a replacement
would not represent a continuity of investment and would not be ac-
corded nonrecognition treatment. If, on the other hand, billiard cen-
ters were an established business in the taxpayer's community, non-
recognition should result.
69. See Filippini v. United States, 318 F.2d 841, 845 (9th Cr. 1963).
70. Id. at 845.
71. It is "Trouble (Oh we've got
Trouble) Right here in River
Cityl (Right here in River
City!) With a capital
T and that rhymes with
P and that stands for
Pool (That stands for
Pool).
M. WILLSON, THE MUsic MAN 36 (1958).
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II. LIKE KIND
The like kind test is a less stringent test for the qualification of
replacement property for nonrecognition. The following discussion
deals with two recent revenue rulings that refused nonrecognition
when condemned land was replaced by improvements to another piece
of land that the taxpayer owned. It is suggested that, although concep-
tually such a result is possible, it does not fit harmoniously with the
liberal interpretation given the like kind test by the courts.
A. Revenue Ruling 76-3972
The taxpayer owned fifteen acres of land that he operated as a
mobile home park. In 1975 the state condemned ten of the fifteen
acres to put in a new highway. The condemnation award exceeded the
taxpayer's tax basis for the land, thereby resulting in a realization of
income. The taxpayer proposed to use the condemnation award to
build a motel that he planned to operate on the remaining five acres.
The Service ruled that this was not property similarly or related in ser-
vice or use to the converted property and denied nonrecognition.' 3
The Service's attack was two-fold: it questioned whether the re-
placement property was like kind property 4 or, failing that, whether it
was similar or related in service or use under section 1033(a)(2)(A). In
applying the like kind test the Service relied on Revenue Ruling 67-
25575 in which the Service had ruled that an office building constructed
on land already owned by the taxpayer did not constitute property that
is of a like kind to the land converted. That ruling asserts that all "real
estate" is not like kind and that "[1]and is not of the same nature or char-
acter as a building," regardless of the fact that they are both referred to
as real estate.76 In applying the service and use test to the facts of Rev-
enue Ruling 76-390, the Service used the owner-user test, concluding
that "the physical characteristics and end uses of a motel are not closely
similar to those of a mobile home park. 77 Thus, nonrecognition was
denied.
B. Revenue Ruling 76-39178
The taxpayer owned 50x acres of unimproved farm land that he
leased to tenant farmers. The taxpayer sold the property under threat
72. 1976-2 C.B. 243.
73. Id.
74. By virtue of such determination the replacement would be considered similar or related
in service or use. I.R.C. § 1033(o.
75. 1967-2 C.B. 270.
76. Id. at 271.
77. 1976-2 C.B. 243.
78. 1976-2 C.B. 243.
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of condemnation to a municipality, and used the proceeds to construct a
commercial building on other land he owned. The building was suit-
able for leasing as five separate units. The interiors of the units
were left unfinished and the taxpayer was responsible for changes to
accomodate new tenants. Although the taxpayer was also responsible
for the surrounding parking lot and for maintenance during vacancies,
the tenants assumed their own maintenance duties when they leased
the property. The taxpayer was responsible for paying real property
taxes and insurance but was to be reimbursed by his tenants. The ten-
ants were responsible for paying personal property taxes.'9
The Service again employed a two fold analysis, applying first the
service or use test in its owner-lessor form, and then applying the like
kind test. In applying the service or use test, the Service ruled that the
difference in the taxpayer's maintenance duties prevented nonrecog-
nition. In applying the like kind test, the Service reaffirmed its position
in Revenue Ruling 76-390 that buildings and land are not like kind
property. The Service stressed that "[a]lthough the term 'real estate'
is often used to describe both land and improvements on the land, land
and improvements are by nature not alike merely because one term is
used to describe both."'8 Thus, nonrecognition was denied.
C. The Like Kind Test
The Service is correct in concluding that all real estate is not of a
like kind. If all real estate were like kind, the words "like kind" in the
statute would be superfluous, because section 1033(i) is limited only to
involuntary conversions of real estate. Such a reading would allow all
replacement property that is realty to qualify for nonrecognition. By
its addition of the like kind test to the Code in 1958,81 however, Con-
gress indicated that it wanted to avoid the strict interpretation the
courts had given to the service or use test. The Senate Finance Commit-
tee report on this amendment referred to section 1031 of the Code,
which allowed nonrecognition of gain where "property held for produc-
tive use in trade or business . .. is exchanged for property of a like
kind. . ". ."" This provision was the subject of liberal interpretation,
including the exchange of improved and unimproved real estate and the
exchange of city property for a farm as like kind property.8 3 Congress
found it "particularly unfortunate that present law requires a closer
identity of the destroyed and [replacement] property where the ex-
79. Id. at 244.
80. Id.
81. Section 46(a) of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, P.L. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1641 added
the current § 1033(f) to the Code, which applies the like kind standard to certain involuntary
conversions of real property.
82. I.R.C. § 1031(a) (emphasis added).
83. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(c) (1956) with Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(9) (1957),
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change is beyond the control of the taxpayer than that which is applied
in the case of the voluntary exchange of business property."' 4
Based on the idea that in both exchanges and involuntary con-
versions gain is not recognized when there is continuity of investment,
the Senate Finance Committee saw "no reason why substantially sim-
ilar rules should not be followed in determining what constitutes a con-
tinuity of investment in these two types of situations. ... 118 Why
Congress chose to restrict the new provision to condemnations of real
property is not known, though undoubtedly there must have been some
feeling that it was more unfair to tax gain realized due to the action of
the government than to tax gains realized due to natural disaster, theft,
or arson.
Whatever the reason, section 1033 today grants like kind treatment
to involuntary conversions involving "real property (not including stock
in trade or other property held primarily for sale) held for productive
use in trade or business or for investment.""" The section 1033 regula-
tions87 refer to section 1031 and the regulations thereunder for a defin-
ition of like kind, thus effectuating Congress' intent that condemned
real property be treated the same as voluntary exchanges. The most
often quoted passage of the regulations on this point is section 1.1031(a)
-I(B) which states that "[a]s used in Section 1031(A) the words 'like
kind' have reference to the nature or character of the property and not
to its grade or quality." Paragraph (c) of that regulation lists examples
of like kind transactions: an exchange of city real estate for a ranch or
farm; exchanges of a leasehold with thirty years or more to run for a
fee; or exchanges of improved real estate for unimproved real estatess
The courts have focused on several criteria for determining
whether replacement property is of a like kind: duration of the inter-
ests; the extent of the interest; and the uses of the property. The Code,
regulations, and cases have not considered the question presented in
the two Revenue Rulings 76-390 and 76-391, which is whether the re-
placement of condemned land with improvements on other land owned
by the taxpayer can qualify for nonrecognition. An analysis of the
cases,89 however, provides a rationale for resolving this issue.
84. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1958).
85. Id.
86. I.R.C. § 1033(f)(3) added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, P.L. No. 94-455,90 Stat. 1525,
allows a taxpayer to elect to treat outdoor advertising displays as real property. It is interesting
to note that while Congress placed this kind of property in the like kind category it actually
specified a slightly more liberal test. Compare § 1033(f)(3)(D) (outdoor advertising displays
"considered property of a like kind ...without regard to whether the taxpayer's interest in
the replacement property is the same kind of interest the taxpayer held in the converted prop-
erty:) with Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c)(2) (1956) (only a leasehold with 30 or more years to run
is like a fee).
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(g)-l (1960).
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-I(c) (1956).
89. Because of Treas. Reg. § I.I033(g)-1 (1960) and congressional intent to apply the § 1031
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1. Fee Interest in Land Replaced by an Interest of Lesser Duration
Treasury regulation section 1.1031(a)-1(c)(2) provides for nonrec-
ognition of gain when a fee interest in real estate is exchanged for a
leasehold having thirty or more years to run. This regulation was up-
held in Century Electric Co. v. Commissioner," which allowed nonrec-
ognition of gain from the sale and ninety-five year leaseback of a
foundry. A more pertinent case, however, is Standard Envelope Atfg.
Co.,91 which addressed the question whether a fee interest exchanged
for a leasehold of less than thirty years is a like kind exchange. In
Standard Envelope the taxpayer sold its property at a loss with a lease-
back for a year during which it expected to find a new headquarters
location. In addition, the taxpayer took an option to extend the lease
for twenty-four years, which it intended to exercise if it were unable to
find a new place. In six months the taxpayer gave up its search and
exercised the option. The Commissioner disallowed a deduction for the
loss on the sale of the property, arguing that the loss should not be rec-
ognized because the taxpayer had received a leaseback-.property of
like kind. The tax court ruled that the loss was deductible, however,
and that the transaction was not a like kind exchange because a lease
must be for thirty years or more to be the equivalent of a fee. 92
A secondary issue in Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc.93 concerned
an exchange of a perpetual right in real estate for an interest of more
limited duration. There the taxpayer made an assignment of an oil
payment in return for a fee title to a ranch and business property. The
Supreme Court held that such an exchange was not one of like kind
properties.94  In doing so, the Court expressed a rationale that may
lie behind many of the duration cases. The Court said that "the ex-
change cannot satisfy [the, 'kind of class of property"] 95 test where the
effect under the tax laws is a transfer of future income from oil leases
for real estate. . . . [T]hese oil payments were merely arrangements
for delayed cash payment of the purchase price of the real estate, plus
interest. 96
The suggestion that such exchanges are not of like kind because
they represented sales of the property for cash substitutes is not expli-
citly supported by the other cases.97 This rationale, however, is sup-
like kind test to condemnations of real property no particular distinction has been made in the
following discussion to distinguish § 1031 like kind from § 1033 like kind.
90. 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951).
91. 15 T.C. 41 (1950).
92. Id. See also May Dep't Stores Co., 16 T.C. 547 (1951).
93. 356 U.S. 260, rehearing denied 356 U.S. 964 (1958). P.G. Lake joined five cases for
decision of a capital gains issue. One, Fleming, also involved a ,laim of nonrecognition of gain
resulting from exchange of property.
94. Id. at 268.
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(b) (1956).
96. 356 U.S. at 268.
97. Nevertheless, most of the other cases and revenue rulings involving the exchange of
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ported in a slightly different context in Revenue Ruling 66-209, 9' which
involved three parcels of land-A, B, and C-in a row. Taxpayer Y
owned lots A and C. X agreed to purchase B and to convey it to Y in
exchange for a thirty year lease on A, B, and C. Rental payments were
$25x for the first year, $80x for the next five years and $90x for the
remainder of the term. Despite the rule in regulation section 1.1031(a)
-(c)(2) allowing nonrecognition on an exchange of a fee for a lease-
hold, the Service ruled that this exchange did not qualify. In explain-
ing the ruling the Service said that the fair market value of lot B was
considered advance rental, as such, and includible in Y's gross income.
Thus, when an interest of lesser duration is exchanged for a fee, there
is a suspicion that the fee is a cash substitute. And although the regu-
lations treat a fee and a thirty-year-or-more lease as equivalents, when
the circumstances are such that the taxpayer is receiving the fee in
lieu of rental payment, the tax benefit is denied.
2. Fee Interests, Easements, and Severable Mineral Rights
While the duration of the interests is a determinative factor, the
question whether the interests are classified as a full fee, an ease-
ment, or severable mineral rights does not seem to be crucial. In Com-
missioner v. Crichton99 the taxpayer exchanged a three-twelfths fee
interest in oil, gas, and other minerals for a one-half fee interest in a
tract of improved city land.'30 The Fifth Circuit held the exchange was
one of like kind, saying.
In the light . . . of the rule the regulation lays down, of the examples
given in the illustrations it puts forth, and of the construction which . . .
the statute has been given . . . it will not do for [the Commissioner] to
now marshal or parade the supposed dissimilarities in grade or quality, the
unlikenesses, in attributes, appearance and capacities, between undivided
real interests in a respectively small town hotel, and mineral proper-
ties. 01
This conclusion has also been reached in a revenue ruling directly in-
volving the like kind clause of section 1033.1°2
Another ruling concerning severable interests in land is Revenue
perpetual rights in property for interests of lesser duration have reached the same result. See,
e.g., Kay Kimbell, 41 B.T.A. 940 (1940) (a working interest in an oil lease and an oil payment not
like kind where oil payment was limited); Midfield Oil Co., 39 B.T.A. 1154 (1939); Rev. Rul
55-749, 1955-2 C.B. 295 (fee title to realty and water rights-where water rights are real property-
are like kind if the rights are perpetual). But see Fleming v. Campbell, 205 F.2d 549 (5th Cir.
1953) (exchange of undivided interest in oil and gas for a royalty of limited duration %as held
like kind).
98. 1966-2 C.B. 299.
99. 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941).
100. Form of ownership has not been an issue in these cases. In Crichton the court treated
the undivided interests of the tenants in common as if they were individual interests.
101. 122 F.2d at 182.
102. Rev. Rul. 72-117, 1972-1 C.B. 226 (unimproved land replaced by interest in overriding
oil and gas royalties).
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Ruling 72-549.103 Under threat of condemnation the taxpayer granted
an exclusive easement over his farm land for power lines. The tax-
payer used the proceeds to purchase a lot with nominal rental improve-
ments and a lot improved with an apartment building. The Service
ruled that because "the easement and right-of-way that the taxpayer
granted and the real estate properties that the taxpayer acquired are
both continuing interests in real property and of the same nature and
character .. . [they] qualify as 'like kind' property under section 1031
of the Code." 1°4
3. Different Uses or Physical Characteristics
A related question is whether a difference in the use or physical
characteristics of the lands affects the like kind determination. The
regulations allow an exchange of unimproved for improved property,
10 5
and this position has been upheld by the courts. In Biscayne Trust
Co.' 6 the Board of Tax Appeals held that an exchange of an investment
in real extate improved by a house with unimproved real estate "held
for like purposes" was an exchange of properties of like kind.10 7
There may be other differences in the use of the properties with-
out disqualifying the replacement. In Revenue Ruling 73-12008 the
corporate taxpayer's assets-water plant, pipelines, water mains, man-
holes-were condemned. The taxpayer purchased an apartment com-
plex from its shareholders with the condemnation award. The Service
ruled that because the corporation had paid an arm's-length purchase
price and because "[b]oth are fee interests in real property and both
either were or will be held for productive use in trade or business or for
investment," the property was a replacement of like kind.) 9
4. Land Replaced by Improvements to Land
In Revenue Ruling 67-255110 the Service reached a result that may
seem inconsistent with other cases and rulings that grant nonrecogni-
tion despite great physical dissimilarities. The ruling involved two
103. 1972-2 C.B. 472.
104. Id. For other rulings involving severable interests, s-e Rev. Rul. 68-331, 1968-1
C.B. 352; Rev. Rul. 55-749, 1955-2 C.B. 295.
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(c) (1956).
106. 18 B.T.A. 1015 (1930).
107. But see Stanley H. Klarkowski, 1965 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 65,328, af'd without discussion
of this point, 385 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1967), in which taxpayer was denied nonrecognition for an
exchange of improved rental property for unimproved farmland that was held for subdivision.
108. 1973-1 C.B. 369.
109. Id. See E.R. Braley, 14 B.T.A. 1153 (1929).
110. 1967-2 C.B. 270. In a recent case the Hawaii district court rejected Revenue Ruling
67-255. Proceeds of condemned agricultural land were used to rmake improvements to an In-
dustrial park also owned by the taxpayer. The court allowed noirecognition because the tax-
payer used the proceeds to reestablish his prior commitment of capital. Davis v. United States,
411 F. Supp. 964 (D. Hawaii 1976).
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separate transactions. The first concerned the replacement of land
held for investment purposes with the construction of an office building
also held for investment purposes on land already owned by the tax-
payer. The second concerned the investment of proceeds from an in-
voluntary conversion of unimproved rural land in the installation of
storm drains, water systems, roads and other improvements to rural
land already owned by the taxpayer. The Service ruled that neither
replacement qualified as like kind property, but the reason for the rul-
ing is not clear except for the Service's observation that not all real
property is like kind.
Revenue Ruling 67-255 is the basis for the conclusions reached on
the like kind issue in both Revenue Ruling 76-390 and Revenue Ruling
76-391."' Neither improved on the Service's earlier analysis of the
problem. A rationale that may serve to explain these rulings is that
because improvements to land have a limited useful life they are analo-
gous to leaseholds of less than thirty years and are therefore not of like
kind with a fee interest in land. Such a rationale fits nicely with the
cases involving mineral rights as well since they also seem to condi-
tion nonrecognition on the duration of the property interests. A com-
plication arises when improvements are compared with fee interests in
oil and gas rights. While such rights are contractually unlimited in
time, common experience indicates that, like buildings and other im-
provements to land, mineral rights are exhausted in time. This fact
has been recognized by Congress and is reflected in the section of the
Code dealing with natural resource depletion deductions
1 2
The basic temporal similarity between depreciable improvements
to land and depletable mineral rights seems to require similar treat-
ment for the two classes of property. The question then remains
whether improvements to land should be included in the class of prop-
erty that is of like kind with mineral rights. Because the charac-
terization of mineral rights as like kind with fee interests in real estate
has received the imprimatur of the courts it seems unreasonable to
treat improvements differently. Thus, the replacement properties in
both Revenue Ruling 76-390 and Revenue Ruling 76-391 should have
been found to be of a like kind with the condemned real estate.
II. CONCLUSION
Only two tests for determining whether property is a qualified
replacement are mandated by the Code. The Service's attempt to
expand the number to three ignores the conceptual framework upon
which the section 1033 nonrecognition provision is built: involuntarily
realized income should not be taxed if the taxpayer takes steps to
111. See notes 75 and 80 supra and accompanying text.
112. I.R.C. §§ 611-614.
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replace the converted property in such a way as to represent a con-
tinuity in his investment. Because it is the investment that is to be
preserved, the rule of qualification should be viewed in light of the
investment character of the properties involved.
The similar or related in service or use test, though not construed
as liberally as the like kind test, has a modicum of flexibility if applied
to all involuntary conversions in accordance with the criteria set forth
in Liant Record and subsequent cases: (1) the demands of the proper-
ties on the taxpayer, (a) the extent of the taxpayer's management
activity, and (b) services rendered by him; and (2) the nature of busi-
ness risks, (a) character and location of the particular properties, (b)
their potential and actual employment, and (c) the state of the market.
The application of a physical characteristics test only restricts the fac-
tors a court may consider in evaluating a given replacement and re-
sults in conclusory justifications for a ruling such as that in Revenue
Ruling 76-319 that offers little on which a taxpayer can base his tax
planning.
The regulations that discuss the like kind test define it as con-
cerned with the nature an character of the property. While these
words remain as vague as the words of the Code itself, a simple test has
emerged from the cases that ties like kind to the duration of the inter-
ests involved. No rationale is given in the regulations for not allowing
an exchange of a fee for a "short term" leasehold to qualify as a like
kind transaction. A rationale that surfaces in the mineral rights cases,
however, is that replacement property whose entire value is reduced to
cash flow in a relatively short time is no more than a cash substitute.
As such, it is not of a like kind to property that is held for productive
use or for investment.
This Note has attempted to extract a rule of law from the cases
tfiat will allow identification of section 1033 replacement property in
the most straightforward and predictable manner. The rules that
emerged are at variance with the rules used by the Service in recent
revenue rulings. The Service's position is strict and unflexible and
may be directed more at protecting the revenue than at intellectual
consistency.
Stephen D. Froikin
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